During the nineteenth century, Britain had an interest in the Arctic. From the early 1800s to the early 1900s, British explorers and the British government traversed the Arctic en masse, unlike the centuries before or after. Not only was there an increase in expeditions, but there was an increase in stories. Throughout the century, the journals of explorers and Romantic art promoted heroic narratives. Explorers derived themes of heroism and exoticism from the Arctic environment. The exploration of the Arctic also arose as a result of Britain’s global domination of the seas. Britain’s secure naval dominance at the beginning of the nineteenth century enabled interest in Arctic exploration and heroic narratives, before waning at the turn of the twentieth century with the lack of financial prospects and the threat to Britain’s naval status.
Since the 1570s, Britain saw economic opportunity in the Arctic for alternative trade routes. As Britain was focused on global investments in Asia and Africa, fewer efforts were made in the north to find financial prospects. At the time, Britain’s sea trade routes were around the Cape Route, a sea trade route that went around Africa to India and East Asia. In the 1570s, a proposal for a sea route that went all the way to the West Indies was made. Martin Frobisher, a sea captain and privateer, believed that a sea route in North America would lead to China and the Indies. In 1576, Martin Frobisher explored Northern Canada in search of the Northwest Passage. When Frobisher found a promising route, Queen Elizabeth promised to “protect her right to this, her route, from all comers and rivals”[1]. At the time, Portugal and Spain held control over the naval trade routes along Africa and South America. A Northwest Passage could circumnavigate the Spaniard’s sea route dominance and provide an economic vantage to Britain. Queen Elizabeth’s promise to protect the Northwest Passage signified the hope for a trade route just for the British in the Arctic.
In the 1700s, the Hudson Bay Company explored the Arctic for new economic prospects. The Hudson Bay Company operated a fur trade monopoly in Quebec and Ontario. When members of an Inuit tribe came to the British with the prospect of copper from a large river, the Hudson Bay Company acted to discover its source. From 1769-71, Samuel Hearn, an employee of the Hudson Bay Company, engaged in three expeditions in search of the copper’s source, finding a river later named Coppermine. Issac Israel Hayes, a former Arctic explorer, believed that Hearn’s efforts to find the Coppermine River were an example of companies engaging in expeditions in “hope of profit”[2]. Companies were the first to explore uncharted territories in search of profit. One effect of the search for Coppermine was that the geographical data discovered provided the company with more areas of exploration. More uncharted territory meant more economic opportunities for the Hudson Bay Company. While they did not find further industries, the geographic discoveries and the Northwest Passage remained as points of intrigue for the Navy to address a century later.
During Pax Britannica, Britain’s status as a global trading partner created opportunities for exploration. Pax Britannica was the period from 1815 to 1914, in which the British government was considered the strongest naval power in the world. After the Napoleonic Wars, the British Royal Navy was so large and dominant that it remained uncontested throughout the nineteenth century. The peace Britain experienced during this time led to the establishment of colonies and naval stations worldwide. Britain’s naval strength can be explained through A.T. Mahan’s theory of sea power. A.T. Mahan was an American naval captain who published The Influence of Sea Power upon History 1660-1783 in 1890. In Mahan’s study, he believed “that the possession of select bases on islands or continental peripheries was more valuable than control of large land masses; that overseas colonies were vital for a nation’s prosperity and that colonial trade was the most treasured commerce of all”[3]. From the perspective of Mahan’s theory, Britain had a strong sea power because they had a wide network of territories which the navy could attack and defend globally. The maintenance of Britain’s global network meant that its economy and navy relied on colonial trade. The exploration and expansion of the sea was necessary for Britain to maintain their position as the strongest naval power. For the Royal Navy, the Arctic was seen as the next frontier of strategic planning.